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INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BONDS AND
ECONOMIC POLICY
ROBERT L. BIRMINGHAM*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Subsection 103(a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
excludes from income subject to tax "the obligations of a State, a
Territory, or a possession of the United States, or any political sub-
division of any of the foregoing, or of the District of Columbia
.... "I This provision repeats in substantially unchanged form a
part of section 22 (b) (4) of the 1939 Code,2 itself an extension of a
rule in effect since 1913.3 ' By a series of revenue rulings the Treas-
ury Department has interpreted it to allow state and local govern-
ments to use the immunity from taxation accorded income from
their securities as a source of subsidy to industry permitting at-
traction of new firms without direct cost.
The principle was clearly stated in 1954:
Bonds duly issued by or on behalf of a municipality for
the purpose of financing the acquisition or construction of
municipally owned industrial plants for lease to private en-
terprises constitute obligations of a political subdivision
.... Interest paid on such bonds is exempt from Fed-
eral income tax ... notwithstanding the purpose for which
they were issued or the fact that the promise to pay is
limited to the revenue to be derived from leasing the
property to be acquired or erected with the proceeds of
the bonds. It is not necessary ... that the obligation be a
general one, pledging the general credit of the municipal-
ity or the use of its taxing power.4
Three years later bonds of an industrial development board es-
tablished under the Alabama Industrial Development Act were held
tax-exempt because issued on behalf of a political subdivision of
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
A.B., Pittsburgh, 1960, LL.B., 1963, Ph.D., 1967; LL.M., Harvard, 1965. U.S.
Representative James G. Fulton of Pennsylvania has been of great assist-
ance to me in collecting materials for this study. He is in no way respon-
sible, however, for the views I express.
1. INT. REV: CODE OF 1954, § 103(a) (1).
2. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 22(b) (4), 52 Stat. 447, 458.
3. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 22(b) (4) (A), 45 Stat. 791, 798;
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b) (4) (a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1065; Revenue
Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 4, 39 Stat. 756, 758; Tariff of 1913, ch. 16, § II-G(a),
38 Stat. 114, 172.
4. Rev. Rul. 54-106, 1954-1 CuM. BULL. 28-29.
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
the state.5 A 1963 ruling that "obligations issued by a nonprofit
corporation formed under the general nonprofit corporation law of
a state for the purpose of stimulating industrial development
within a political subdivision of the state" will under certain con-
ditions "be considered issued 'on behalf of' the political subdivi-
sion"6 has been termed by a critic "a blueprint for issuance of
tax-exempt bonds to finance private ventures, provided a state,
municipality, or political subdivision is willing to cooperate."'7
Conforming securities have been thus described:
[I] ndustrial development bonds are municipal bonds issued
to finance a city's acquisition of a suitable site and the
construction of an industrial building thereon. Under
the terms of firm contracts made prior to the sale of the
bonds, this facility will be leased to a private industrial
concern with rentals at least sufficient to cover the debt
service and all costs connected with the bond issue. The
bonds are secured by a pledge of the rentals and, in most
cases, by a mortgage on all property acquired or con-
structed with the proceeds of the bonds. In some states,
the full faith and credit of the municipality involved may
be pledged to the payments of the bonds, or they may be
additionally secured by a pledge of surplus revenues from
other municipal projects.8
On July 24, 1967, Representative John W. Byrnes of Wisconsin,
ranking Republican member of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee, introduced a bill which would limit the exclusion granted
by subsection 103 (a) (1).9 He proposes adoption of a new subsection
103(c), paragraph (1) of which would remove from tax-exempt
status "any industrial development bond . . . issued after Decem-
5. Rev. Rul. 57-187, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 65.
6. Rev. Rul. 63-20, 1963-1 CuM. BULL. 24, 25. Five requirements
are enumerated:
(1) the corporation must engage in activities which are essen-
tially public in nature;(2) the corporation must be one which is not organized for profit(except to the extent of retiring indebtedness);(3) the corporate income must not inure to any private person;(4) the state or political subdivision thereof must have a bene-
ficial interest in the corporation while the indebtedness remains
outstanding and it must obtain full legal title to the property of
the corporation with respect to which the indebtedness was in-
curred upon the retirement of such indebtedness; and(5) the corporation must have been approved by the state or a
political subdivision thereof, either of which must also have ap-
proved the specific obligations issued by the corporation.
Id. at 25.
7. Spiegel, Financing Private Ventures with Tax-Exempt Bonds: A
Developing "Truckhole" in the Tax Law, 17 STAN. L. REV. 224, 227 (1965).
8. Abbey, Municipal Industrial Development Bonds, 19 VAND. L.
REV. 25, 26 (1965).
9. H.R. 11645, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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ber 31, 1967." Securities covered are designated in paragraph (2)
of the suggested addition. Subparagraph (A) states the general
rule:
For purposes of this subsection, the term "industrial de-
velopment bond" means an obligation the payment of the
principal or interest on which is-
(i) secured in whole or in part by a lien, mortgage,
pledge, or other security interest in property of a charac-
ter subject to the allowance for depreciation, or
(ii) secured in whole or in part by an interest in
(or to be derived primarily from) payments to be made in
respect of money or property of a character subject to
the allowance for depreciation
which is or will be used under a lease, sale, or loan ar-
rangement, for industrial or commercial purposes.
That not all tax-exempt securities used by state or local government
to finance private industrial enterprise and thus commonly con-
sidered industrial development bonds are included within the sug-
gested definition is made clear by comment on the scope of the
proposed legislation: "The bill does not affect the interest from
bonds ... which are: (a) Unsecured general obligations of the
local government, or an agency thereof, regardless of the purpose
for which the funds may be used."'10
Further exceptions are set forth in subparagraph (B):
For purposes of subparagraph (A), property shall not be
treated as used for industrial or commercial purposes if it
is used-
(i) to provide entertainment (including sporting
events) or recreational facilities for the general public;
10. Scope of Proposed Amendment to Section 103 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 Relating to Industrial Development Bonds, 113 CONG.
REC. H9191 (daily ed. July 24, 1967). This statement also more clearly
delineates the target of corrective efforts:
The bill would make subject to tax interest or industrial develop-
ment bonds issued after December 31, 1967, which are:(a) Secured by the obligation of an industrial or commercial
enterprise to make payments on account of the use of depreciable
property such as buildings, machinery and equipment, and other
property of a character subject to an allowance for depreciation.(b) Secured by the obligation of an industrial or commercial
enterprise to make payments on account of the purchase of de-
preciable property such as buildings, machinery and equipment,
and any other property of a character subject to an allowance for
depreciation.(c) Secured by the obligation of an industrial or commercial
enterprise to make payments on account of funds received from
the issuing agency as a loan, advance, or other contribution to
capital.
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(ii) to provide facilities for the holding of a con-
vention, trade show, or similar event;
(iii) as an airport, dock, wharf, or similar trans-
portation facility;
(iv) in the furnishing or sale of electric energy, gas,
water, or sewage disposal services; or
(v) in an active trade or business owned and op-
erated by an organization described in subsection (a) (1).
Paragraph (3) further restricts the advocated change by excluding
from coverage by paragraph (1) any obligation issued before Jan-
uary 1, 1969, for a project assisted by the federal government un-
der Title I of the Housing Act of 194911 or under Titles I or II of the
Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965.12
B. IMPETUS
The proposed legislation is by no means the first attempt to
preclude the financing of private ventures with tax-exempt securi-
ties. 13 The recent rapid growth in the size and number of such
offerings has however added urgency to the demands of critics
that use of industrial development bonds be curtailed.
. Promotion of enterprise through use of tax advantages granted
securities of units of state and local government first gained promi-
nence as a part of the Mississippi Balance Agriculture With Indus-
try (BAWI) plan of 1936.14 Under this program as initially struc-
tured the sponsoring community pledged its credit to obtain the
necessary capital but charged only nominal rent to attracted les-
sees. It was also possible for a municipality itself to operate an
enterprise thus financed. Only twelve plants were established with
its aid between 1936 and 1940, and none in the following four
years; the amount raised to finance an individual facility during
this initial period in no case exceeded 300,000 dollars.' 5
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1450-65 (1964). H.R. 11645 would also provide for
amendment of § 102(g) of the Housing Act of 1949 to eliminate industrial
revenue bonds from the group of securities there granted tax-exempt sta-
tus. See id. § 1452(g).
12. Id. §§ 3131-43.
13. See Abbey, supra note 8, at 57; Lent, The Origin and Survival of
Tax-Exempt Securities, 12 NAT'L TAX J. 301, 304-14 (1959); Spiegel, supra
note 7, at 225. In 1966 Representative Byrnes himself proposed parallel
legislation which would have treated "the rental value of a facility supplied
to an industry by a municipality or other governmental authority, ad-justed for the actual rents paid, as taxable income to the user of the
facility." 112 CONG. REC. 7416 (daily ed. April 6, 1966). See H.R. 14313,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
14. Miss. CODE ANN. § 8936(5) (1957).
15. MOES, LOCAL SUBSIDIES FOR INDUSTRY 74 (1962). See id. at 71-80;
Abbey, supra note 8, at 27.
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No state followed the pioneering efforts of Mississippi until
1946, when the Kentucky legislature authorized issuance of revenue
bonds, supported solely by project rents, to finance construction
of facilities to be leased to private industry.16 Alabama introduced
the local development corporation in 1949.17 Proliferation of, aid
programs since 1951 resulted in statutes permitting use of industrial
development bonds in twenty-three states by 1965.18 The trend
is continuing:
Today, some 35 States have qualified either directly, or
through municipalities, or through State or county indus-
trial development agencies, to issue revenue bonds exempt
from Federal tax, the proceeds to be used for the benefit
of private industry. Some 13 more States have either au-
thorized or are considering the authorization of industrial
financing through local or State bonding .... [W] e are
fast approaching the day when all 50 States will be en-
gaged in this form of financing.19
The proposed bond issue in the test case under the Missis-
sippi act totaled 35,000 dollars.2 0 In 1951 public offerings of securi-
ties which would be denied tax-exempt status under the bill
amounted to less than 7 million dollars. 1 . Current figures dwarf
these sums and continue to increase: "As recently as 1960, less
than $50 million worth of revenue bonds were issued. Last year
the volume was more than $1 billion and included a $70 million
and a $60 million offering. ' '22 Capital raised is frequently dramati-
cally in excess of that which could be obtained by the sponsoring
community through pledge of its own credit:
Take the case of Camden, Ala., with a population of only
1,132. This community borrowed $70 million to finance a
venture of United Fruit Co. and MacMillan Bloedel, Ltd., of
Canada .... Or the case of the aluminum plant to be
built in Warrenton, Oreg., with an issue of $140 million in
tax-free municipal industrial bonds. Warrenton is a town
of 1,117 population. In another typical case-that of Jer-
ome, Ark.,-35 registered voters were asked to -vote upon a
$20 million bond authorization last October, the purpose
of which was to finance a knitting mill. The bond issue
represented more than a half million dollars per voter.23
16. Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 103, 200-85 (1963).
17. ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 815-30(1) (1958).
18. Abbey, supra note 8, at 29.
19. 113 CONG. REC. H9190 (daily ed. July 24, 1967).
20. Abbey, supra note 8, at 27.
21. 113 CONG. REC. H9190 (daily ed. July 24, 1967).
22. Metcalf, War Between the States, MAGAZINE WALL STREET, Feb. 18,
1967, at 26, 27.
23. 113 CONG. REC. H9190 (daily ed. July 24, 1967).
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. Advantages of industrial development bonds to sponsoring com-
munities and attracted firms sufficiently explain their increasingly
widespread use. Exclusion of interest on such securities from tax-
able income permits their issuance at rates between 1 and 1.5 per
cent below those which would otherwise be required.24  Gain
from inexpensive financing of plant construction may be passed
directly to private concerns to induce location where such sub-
sidization is available: rental payments are deductible as business
expense by the leasing enterprise25 and local government pays no
income tax on funds thus received.26 Since the credit of the issuing
political unit is generally not pledged and promotional and other
expenses can be recovered as rent, it is possible to lure industry
without risk or cost. Attracted firms benefit from reduced produc-
tion costs.
II. POLEMICAL SUPPORT OF REMEDIAL ACTION
The most vociferous attacks on the use of tax-exempt securities
to support local programs promoting industrialization have been
made by those opposing such government intervention as in prin-
ciple politically unjustifiable. Criticism by this outraged group,
more entertaining than impressive, early assumed a standard form.
A Mississippi banker, dissatisfied with small-scale subsidization of
enterprise by his state under the pioneering Balance Agriculture
With Industry plan of 1936, claimed: "The thing was outright So-
cialism and should never have been attempted, much less held con-
stitutional.
' 27
24. Bridges, State and Local Government Financial Inducements for
Industry, TAx POLICY, Jan.-Feb. 1965, at 3, 5.
25. Deduction may be made for "rentals or other payments required
to be made as a condition to the continued use or possession, for purposes
of the trade or business, of property to which the taxpayer has not taken
or is not taking title or in which he has no equity." INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 162(a) (3).
26. Gross income does not include "income derived from any public
utility or the exercise of any essential governmental function and accruing
to a State or Territory, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District
of Columbia." Id. § 115(a) (1).
27. MOES, supra note 15, at 74. Accusations of subversion are com-
mon with respect to tax measures: "With the passage of the Sixteenth
Amendment, American citizens have no constitutional right to keep a
single dollar of their income. One plank of the Communist Manifesto of
1848 has been achieved." Pettergill, The History of a Prophecy: Class
War and the Income Tax, 39 A.B.A.J. 473, 475 (1953). It may be argued
that greater dangers exist: "The destiny of our Western civilization turns
on the issue of our struggle with all that Madison Avenue stands for more
than it turns on the issue of our struggle with Communism." A. Toynbee,
quoted in Books, TIME, Oct. 20, 1967, at 102.
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This approach has been widely followed. The Idaho court,
holding a statutory authorization to issue industrial development
bonds unconstitutional, stated:
The evident purpose of the exemption contained in the act
is to extend to the purchasers of the bonds and securi-
ties the protection and advantage of an exemption from
taxation.... It is obvious that private enterprise, not so
favored, could not compete with industries operating there-
under. If the state-favored industries were successfully
managed, private enterprise would of necessity be forced
out, and the state, through its municipalities, would increas-
ingly become involved in promoting, sponsoring, regulating
and controlling private business, and our free private enter-
prise economy would be replaced by socialism. The con-
stitutions of both state and nation were founded upon a
capitalistic private enterprise economy and were designed
to protect and foster private property and private initia-
tive. Socialism is as foreign to our constitutional, political
and economic system as our private enterprise system is to
the socialist system of Russia.28
A member of the Alabama court, dissenting from an advisory opin-
ion approving such securities, asserted: "The declared purpose of
the scheme . . . is to induce business interests to migrate to and
settle in Alabama and become lessees of publicly owned and con-
trolled tax-free projects . . The present drift is leading to so-
cialism.' '29 A more recent critic has proclaimed:
The trend to federalization or state socialism has been
marked in the last 30 years .... There has been some
quibbling as to whether municipal industrial aid is in ef-
fect state socialism. Definitions are advanced to indicate
that in effect municipal industrial aid does not transfer
ownership of private industry to the public sector....
To say that ownership of an industrial plant leased to
private enterprise is not a step toward socialism is playing
with semantics. Even though the municipal aspects
might be construed as a subterfuge to cloak the real own-
ership, the very fact that this has been accomplished in
the guise of a municipal project stamps the process as so-
cialistic. In addition, the acceptance of inducements, in-
cluding tax exemption of the interest on the municipal
industrial bonds, is another step toward socialism.30
28. Village of Moyie Springs, Idaho v. Aurora Mfg. Co., 82 Idaho
337, 349-50, 353 P.2d 767, 775 (1960).
29. In re Opinion of the Justices, 53 So. 2d 840, 845 (Ala. 1951)
(dissenting opinion).
30. Browne, The Case Against Municipal Industrial Revenue Bonds,
TAX POLIcY, Jan.-Feb. 1965, at 12, 15. "The financing of private enterprises
with public funds is foreign to the fundamental concepts of our constitu-
tional system. To permit such encroachments upon the prohibitions of the
1968]
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Opposition to innovation without discussion of its benefits or
dangers appears founded on a principle enunciated by a Duke of
Cambridge in the eighteenth century: "Any change of any kind at
any time for any purpose is to be deplored."3' Such an attitude
unhappily finds substantial support in legal literature: "Sir, the
law is as I say it is, and so it has been laid down ever since the law
began; and we have several set forms which are held as law, and
so held and used for good reason, though we cannot at present
remember that reason. '3 2  To the extent that cries of socialism
mask more legitimate appeals for preservation of the economic
efficiency of our present system they will be treated in greater
detail below; as emotional outbursts, however, they should be
disregarded.33
Constitution would bring about, as experience and history have demon-
strated, the ultimate destruction of the private enterprise system." State
ex rel. Beck v. City of York, 164 Neb. 223, 229-30, 82 N.W.2d 269, 273 (1956).
See also State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d 779, 785 (Fla. 1953).
31. Quoted in Wheat, Panel: Mutual Funds as Investors of Large
Pools of Money, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 671 (1967).
32. Pronouncement by Chief Justice Fortescue in 1458, Y.B. 36 Hen.
6, f. 25b, pl. 26, quoted in LEACH, PROPERTY LAW INDIcTED!-OR THE PEOPLE
vs. BLACKSTONE, KENT, GRAY AND STARE DECIsIs (ACCESSORIES: PONTIUS
PILATE AND THE LAWS OF THE MEDES AND THE PERSIANS) 2 (1967). Even
earlier precedent exists:
In the year AD 61 the prefect of the city of Rome, Pendanius
Secundus, was murdered by one of the slaves in his town house.
Under the law, not only the culprit but all the other slaves in
the household had to be executed, in this instance numbering four
hundred. There was a popular outcry and the Senate debated the
question. Some senators rose to plead clemency, but the day was
carried by the distinguished jurist, Gaius Cassius Longinus, who ar-
gued that all change from ancestral laws and customs is always for
the worse. When a mob tried to prevent the sentence from being
carried out, the emperor personally intervened on the side of the
law, though he rejected another proposal that Pendanius's ex-
slaves should also be punished by banishment. That, he said,
would be unnecessary cruelty.
Finley, Book Review, N.Y. REV. oF BOOKS, Jan. 26, 1967, at 6.
33. Deviation from laissez-faire principles occurred even in early
nineteenth-century Britain. MacDonagh, discussing the Passenger Act of
1803, 43 Geo. 3, c. 56, states:
The new act was introducing a revolutionary principle to English
law, a principle of first importance which was to have no true
counterpart in other fields for thirty years to come. This innova-
tion was the interference of the legislature with freedom of con-
tract-for to buy a passage was after all to make a contract-
upon the ground that the free, sane and adult citizens concerned
required a peculiar statutory protection in these transactions.
MACDONAGH, A PATTERN OF GOVERNMENT GROWTH, 1800-1860, at 59 (1961),
quoted in BURN, THE AGE OF EQuIPOISE-A STUDY OF THE MID-VICTORIAN
GENERATION 165 (Norton Library ed. 1965).
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III. ARGUMENTS OF INEFFICACY
A. PRISONER'S DILEMMA
More sophisticated advocates of reform claim that use of in-
dustrial development bonds is now so common that firms seeking
new facilities expect such financial aid in any case and thus base
locational decisions on other considerations:
Is it sound policy for states and municipalities to grant
tax exemptions? Certainly something will depend here
upon the universality of the exemption program. If one
merchant keeps his store open on Sunday while others are
closed he can make money by so doing. But if all mer-
chants follow the same policy none of them are benefited.
Similarly, if only one municipality were to offer special tax
advantages, it could attract, perhaps, a considerable number
of desirable industries, but when the favors are universal-
ized they cease to be effective. Of course, one municipality
can outdo another in its inducements. The question then
arises as to when and where will the competition in sub-
sidies stop?8 4
They reason: "As the process spreads, the actual effect on the loca-
tion of industry diminishes, and the net effect will be simply to
erode the federal corporate tax base and to raise interest charges on
all tax-free state and municipal securities, thus in the end hurting
the protagonists in the process."85 Byrnes concludes: "This tax
avoidance has become so widespread that no one benefits except
the private borrower."36
The situation described by these critics is best analyzed as an
instance of Prisoner's Dilemma, a paradox of game theory which
is currently the focus of much attention from economists and
other social scientists.8 7 Assume two individuals, 1 and 2, have
34. Groves, Effects of Tax Exemption and Tax Differentials on the
Location of Business, in NATIONAL TAX ASS'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-
FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION 557, 564-65 (1939), quoted in
MoEs, supra note 15, at 222.
35. Cooper, National Economic Policy in an Interdependent World
Economy, 76 YALE L.J. 1273, 1296 n.39 (1967).
36. 113 CONG. REC. H9190 (daily ed. July 24, 1967). "[U]ndesirable
competition may and does usually result, with only the companies benefit-
ing at the expense of the general public .... The greatest evil is that a
vicious circle is created . . ." Derber, Municipal Subsidy, of Private In-
dustry, 32 THE MUNICIPALITY (1937), quoted in MOES, supra note 15, at 226.
See also SCHULTZ & HARRISS, AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE 81 (1959).
37. The pioneering exposition of game theory is VON NEUMANN &
MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1953). The
most satisfactory text is LUCE & RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS (1957). A
good introductory work is RAPOPORT, TwO-PERSON GAME THEORY (1966).
See also RAPOPORT & CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DILEMMA (1965); Rapoport,
Escape from Paradox, SCIENTIFIC AM., July 1967, at 50.
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robbed a bank. They have been apprehended by the police and
isolated in separate cells. The district attorney tells each that al-
though he is certain of their guilt he has insufficient evidence to
convict them of robbery. He asserts, however, that even without
further information he will be able to secure their conviction on a
lesser charge carrying a penalty of imprisonment for one year.
He urges each of the prisoners to confess, promising that if one
cooperates and the other remains silent, he will escape punish-
ment, while his recalcitrant partner will be incarcerated for ten
years. If both confess, each will receive a sentence of six years.
1 and 2 accept the accuracy of this outline of possible conse-
quences and must decide whether to confess.
Results of choices which confront the prisoners are depicted in
the diagram below. The first and second numbers in each set of
parentheses measure on an ordinal scale the worth or utility of
designated outcomes to 1 and 2 respectively. The value of solu-
tions to each individual is here assumed to vary inversely with
the length of the prison sentence imposed on him. An ordinal
scale is one which "allows only the determination of the rank of a
set of objects, but not the 'distances' between them."38  Following
Bentham, we may define "utility" as "that property in any object,
whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or
happiness (all this in the present case comes to the same thing)."39
a2 b2
al (1, 1) (-2, 2)
bi (2, -2) (-1, -1)
By choosing a, (remaining silent) or b, (confessing) player 1
can select the outcomes of either the first row or the second row.
Similarly 2 can choose between the first and second columns. For
example, the value of joint silence, a utility of 1 to each prisoner,
can be determined from the upper left set of solutions. Since
2 > 1 > -1 > -2, individual 1 will prefer the outcome at the lower left.
The upper left is more desirable to him than the lower right,
while the upper right is least satisfactory. Outcomes may be simi-
larly ranked in order of decreasing desirability to individual 2:
upper right, upper left, lower right, lower left.
Obviously each prisoner can maximize his own well-being
through confession. Assume that player 1 chooses to confess.
Then, if player 2 remains silent, l's choice yields to 1 a utility of 2,
greater than the level 1 which he could obtain through silence.
38. RAPOPORT, STRATEGY AND CONSCIENCE 310 (1964).
39. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 18 (Dolphin ed. 1961).
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On the other hand, if player 2 confesses, player l's confession gives
a utility of -1, rather than the -2 which 1 would obtain if he re-
mained silent. Player 2 faces a similar outcome pattern. Thus
each prisoner, acting rationally, will confess. Their joint confes-
sions will dictate the outcome in the lower right corner, a utility
of -1 to each. If both had remained silent, each would have ob-
tained a utility of 1. Rational decision paradoxically results in
incarceration of each prisoner for five more years than would be
necessary if both had irrationally remained silent.
40
B. EVALUATION
A Pareto Optimum is a set of imputations such that it is im-
possible to increase the utility of any one individual without reduc-
ing the utility of some other.41  In games fitting the Prisoner's
40. A recently devised game provides a striking if unrealistic illustra-
tion of the impact of inability to enforce cooperation among individuals.
Assume three players. Player 1 will pay $1 to the other player bidding the
most for it. Players 2 and 3 may not coordinate their bids. After each bid
by either 2 or 3, the other is informed of his opponent's offer and may raise
his bid by a cent or more. The game terminates when neither player
wishes to rebid. Player 1 is awarded the last bids of both players. Each
player bids so as to utilize any opportunity to increase his gain or reduce
his loss, always calculating the advantage of any action without regard to
the possibility of subsequent responsive readjustment of the competing
offer. Under these conditions bidding will continue indefinitely, the loss to
2 and 3 eventually exceeding any finite sum. Ability to cooperate would
have allowed them to divide a small gain. I am indebted to one of my
students, Mr. Arthur Wolfe, for this example.
41. Tullock has recently provided a striking illustration of Pareto
Optimality:
Benefactor organizes an enterprise called "Aid for the Sick and
Starving Children of Gwondonaland," and solicits voluntary gifts
for its support. This enterprise does not, however, waste any of
its money in Gwondonaland. All of the contributions that it re-
ceives (except Benefactor's entrepreneurial profit) are devoted
solely to raising the utility of the donors. It publishes a newslet-
ter (on what appears to be cheap paper) full of affecting stories of
suffering and its alleviation. These stories, produced by the best
writers money can hire, are illustrated by touching before and af-
ter pictures produced by skilled photographers using all the re-
sources of the New York modeling agencies. Any donor who
gives more than $10.00 receives a "personal letter" in a childish
scrawl expressing gratitude and suggesting further contributions.
Donors of more than $100.00 receive "native handicraft" allegedly
produced by the children of Gwondonaland .... As a result of
Benefactor's activities, many contributors have the satisfaction of
thinking that they are alleviating suffering .... [T]hey are hap-
pier about this charity than they would be if money were put into
actually helping the children and the flow of newsletters, etc.,
were less well financed.
Tullock, Information Without Profit, 1 PAPERS ON NON-MARKET DECISION
MAKING 141, 142-43 (1966). The author comments: "This project. . . meets
the welfare criteria of Paretian economics .... There is no change which
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Dilemma model all solutions except that resulting from the antici-
pated independent decisions are Pareto optimal. The prisoners can-
not obtain the outcome in the upper left corner, preferred by each
to that in the lower left, because they are unable convincingly
to commit themselves to silence. Since equilibrium is inefficient in
that both players could gain if an alternate solution could be
reached, one would expect participants, competitors in some re-
spects, to unite in seeking from the legal system a means of en-
forcing agreements. The common law of contracts provides this
in the general case. On a macropolitical level so does the Social
Contract.
Much legislation either prohibits private agreement or substi-
tutes for it. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, for example, provides:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ....
Conversely government programs restricting agricultural output
may be viewed as the only technique by which the members of
the farming community can bind themselves to joint action. It
is apparent that competition itself is a Prisoner's Dilemma situa-
tion. Where rivals are few government intervention is frequently
necessary to preclude its elimination. Where there are many buy-
ers or sellers, on the other hand, costs of negotiating private agree-
ments and rewards of individual nonparticipation are often suf-
ficiently great to require public action if mitigation of market forces
is found desirable.
Enforced cooperation will unquestionably benefit those in-
volved in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Legislation does not elimi-
nate all major instances of its play because the community includes
not only the participants but also others affected by their actions.
Thus Darwinian competition, admittedly painful to competitors, is
frequently considered advantageous to society. Pleas for elimina-
tion of rivalry, even among units of government, therefore cannot
be adequately supported merely by demonstrating that these units
would profit from controls: the impact of corrective measures on
other groups must be taken into account.
can be suggested which would 'benefit at least one person while injuring
no one.'" Id. at 143. With .respect to the purported recipients of the
charitable contributions he adds: "In particular it should be noted that the
starving children of Gwondonaland are in no way injured by the organiza-
tion. They would, of course, be better off if the AFTSASCOG were to
divert some of its resources from directly serving its customers, the do-
nors, to help in Gwondonaland, but they would also be better off if U. S.
steel similarly made contributions to their welfare." Id.
42. 15-U.S.C. § 1 (1963).
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Concern for local development preceded a widespread desire to
industrialize. Sinclair, discussing settlement of the Midwest in
the nineteenth century, notes: "Agricultural journals and local
newspapers frantically painted the Western skies into the colors
of a peacock's tail to keep old settlers where they were and to
attract fresh ones. For if a small town did not grow, it was aban-
doned; Iowa, in less than a hundred years, held more than two
thousand deserted settlements. '48  However the urge to expand
was rationalized, 44 resulting competition among communities did
not go unexploited by private enterprise:
The railroad promoters, asking communities to bid against
one another, profited by deflecting their route this way or
that. Citizens of North Liberty, Iowa, in public meeting
adopted a resolution (December 13, 1865), "That Johnson
County donate half a million dollars rather than this Rail
Road should be made twenty miles east or west of us."
In 1869 Indiana railroad-builders were openly offering to
run their line through Covington in return for a donation
of eighty thousand dollars; otherwise, they threatened to
move it in the direction of Perryville. Sometimes this
competition produced bizarre results.
The New York and Oswego Midland railroad, completed in
1873, had gone zigzagging across the state in search of
municipal bonds. When larger cities like Syracuse refused
to subscribe, the line actually secured some six million
dollars in municipal aid from nearly fifty towns, mostly
small. To pick up these sums it ended up crossing the
breadth of the state without passing through a single
major city.4 5
Recent efforts to attract manufacturing activity are neverthe-
less not without venerable precedent. As early as 1791 a private
venture in New Jersey was financed by local government debt and
granted exemption from state taxes. In the nineteenth century
Vermont, Delaware, and Rhode Island enacted legislation relieving
new enterprise of at least a part of its normal fiscal burden.46
43. SINCLAIR, PROHIBITION: THE ERA OF ExCESS 12-13 (1962).
44. The settlement of the country and the increase of the timber
has already changed for the better the climate of that portion of
Nebraska lying along the Missouri, so that within the last twelve
or fourteen years the rain has gradually increased in quantity and
is more equally distributed through the year. I am confident that
this change will continue to extend across the dry belt to the foot
of the Rocky Mountains as the settlements extend and the forest-
trees are planted in proper quantities.
Statement by Ferdinand V. Hayden, Director of the Geological and Geo-
graphical Survey of the Territories, to the Secretary of the Interior, 1867,
quoted in BOORSTIN, THE AMERMCANS 232 (1965).
45. Id. at 255-56.
46. Morgan, The Effects of State and Local Tax and Financial In-
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Rivalry has increased as the benefits of industry have become more
widely recognized. Units of state and local government frequently
tender inducements requiring substantial financial sacrifice by
the offeror: 47 the cost in lost revenue of tax concessions granted
new or expanded enterprise between 1958 and 1961 in Alabama,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
and Vermont has been estimated to total more than 167 million
dollars.48 Industrial development bonds have been singled out for
attack not because they are a weapon in the competition for new
factories but because the cost of their use falls only incidentally on
the sponsoring community.
Critics have been almost unanimous in designation of the unde-
sirable characteristics of industrial development bonds. Most agree
that they lower federal revenue and reduce the progressivity of the
tax structure. It is also urged that their continued use, by "greatly
increasing the total of exempt bonds outstanding will eventually
drive up the interest rates paid by all states and municipalities
for their borrowing. Yet there will be no commensurate increase
in public service to compensate for the cost to the taxpayers. ' '49
Other unhappy consequences are foreseen: "[S] erious reservations
• . . had to do with the possibility that the bonds might hinder
the sale of legitimate municipal issues. 'If an investor has a choice
between speculating on a large corporation or on the East Turkey-
foot Authority, chances are he's going to buy the industrials.' ))50
Byrnes concludes:
Not only is there a serious revenue loss to the Federal
Treasury, but the cost of other public financing by State
and local agencies has been increased. There are innumer-
able cases where school districts and municipalities have
been required to pay interest in excess of 5 percent on
tax-exempt issues because these obligations must be of-
fered in competition with industrial development bonds.
Unless prompt action is taken . . . the savings in interest
costs enjoyed by our local governments will be completely
eroded.51
ducements on Industrial Location 115 (unpublished dissertation in Uni-
versity of Colorado Library 1964).
47. See, e.g., Bridges, State and Local Inducements for Industry
(pts. 1-2), 18 NAT'L TAX J. 1, 175 (1965); Gold, Subsidies to Industry in
Pennsylvania, 19 NAT'L TAX J. 286 (1966).
48. Morgan, supra note 46, at 126 (Table IX). Calculations incor-
porate the assumption that local investment would not have been reduced
if such tax relief had not been available.
49. Fowler Hints of Steps to Narrow Exemption of Some Tax-Exempts,
Wall Street J., June 17, 1966, at 25, col. 3.
50. THE WEEKLY BOND BUYER, Sept. 11, 1967, at 45, 47.
51. 113 CONG. REC. H9190-91 (daily ed. July 24, 1967).
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Interest rates on tax-exempt securities have risen dramatically
in the last two decades. A group of long-term bonds which yielded
an average of 1.78 per cent in December 1946 returned 3.57 per cent
and 4.01 per cent ten and twenty years later.52 This trend has con-
tinued: one popular average, which stood at 4.02 per cent in De-
cember 1966, had reached 4.37 per cent by November 22, 1967, its
highest level since April 1934.58 The value of outstanding state and
local government issues concomitantly increased from less than 16
billion dollars in 1946 to more than 47 billion dollars in 1956 and al-
most 105 billion dollars in 1966. 54 Since only a small proportion of
these securities were industrial development bonds,55 it is unlikely
that their growing importance played a substantial role in the rise
in interest rates. That yields of taxable securities have increased
more rapidly than those of tax-exempts over the last decade 5
indeed suggests that factors other than disproportionate supply of
one type of bond, for instance monetary policy, have played
key roles.
Critics correctly urge that if income from industrial develop-
ment bonds were taxable the government would receive more
revenue. However the goal of tax policy should not be to raise
funds to cover public expenditures but rather to control private
demand. Presumably authorities can perform this function with
almost equal facility regardless of the status of the securities in
question.
The availability of industrial development bonds reduces the
progressivity of the tax structure by enabling the more wealthy to
shield their receipts from government levy at the expense of the
general taxpayer. Assuming that the marginal utility of income
to an individual decreases as income rises 57 and that the rich on
52. MOODY'S MUNICIPAL AND GOVERNMENT MANUAL a23-24 (1967).
53. Allan, Rates up Sharply on Tax-Exempts, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23,
1967, at 67, col. 1.
54. MOODY'S MUNICIPAL AND GOVERNMENT MANUAL a16-17 (1967).
55. See § I.B supra.
56. See MOODY'S MUNICIPAL AND GOVERNMENT MANUAL a21-22 (1967).
57. The proof of this proposition, widely accepted as intuitively cor-
rect, is implicit in the St. Petersburg Paradox. Reconciliation of subjec-
tive estimates of the worth of the game with its fair value in money terms
requires recognition that little utility is attached to the marginal dollars of
relatively large sums:
The nature of the paradox is this: a coin tossed until heads ap-
pears; if heads appears on the first toss, A pays B $1; if heads
appears for the first time on the second toss, A pays B $2, and
so on, always paying $2n-1 for each toss if heads appears. What
fee should B be willing to pay for the privilege of playing the
game if it is to be a "fair game"? A "fair game" is one in which
the player pays no more than the total mathematical expectation
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the average do not take greater pleasure from a given amount of
money than the poor, a policy dividing a fixed national income
equally among the people would be most likely to maximize wel-
fare. Since national income is itself a result of productive effort,
however, some degree of income inequality must be preserved to
provide work incentive. The most satisfactory compromise is prob-
ably at a higher level of progressivity than has been achieved in
the United States. Even if the distribution of income is considered
optimal, however, it may be argued that exemptions making nomi-
nal rates of taxation illusory58 or granting artificial advantage to
the conservative investment should be eliminated. Nevertheless
opposition to industrial development bonds on these grounds can-
not logically be divorced from attack on all tax-exempt issues: if
subsidization of state and local government financing efforts is
considered desirable, it may be accomplished without simultane-
ously benefiting those in the upper income brackets. Thus Mus-
grave advocates "the removal of tax exemption on state and local
securities, which now offer a low-risk haven to potential risk
capital, and substitution (if needed) of a more efficient technique
of federal aid to state and local debt financing."5 9
IV. IMPACT ON ENTERPRISE
While both critics and proponents of industrial development
bonds agree that their use normally benefits attracted corpora-
tions by reducing plant and equipment costs, most discussion of
the consequences of assistance has concerned its effect on plant
location. Advocates of reform urge: "[T] he ability of a local gov-
ernmental unit to offer tax-free financing to industry no longer
constitutes an inducement. It has become a way of life. A com-
pany desiring to build a new plant almost assumes that tax-free
financing will be available."60  Such aid should stimulate invest-
of success, the actuarial value of the gamble, at each stage of the
game. The expected gain or loss of income from a "fair bet,"
therefore, always equals zero. The mathematical expectation of
heads on the first toss is p.$1=(2).$1=$0.50; on the second toss
(l-p) (p).$2= ( ) (%) .$2=$0.50; on the nth toss (y )n.$2n-1=$2n-1/
2n=$0.50. Since the total expectation E is the sum of the expecta-
tions at each state, E - $0.50 + $0.50 + . . . . The sum of this in-
finite series is infinite and so B must pay A an infinite sum of
money for the privilege of playing this "fair game."
BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 307 (1962). See Jensen, An In-
troduction to Bernoullian Utility Theory, 69 SWED. J. ECON. 163 (1967).
58. See Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income
Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REv. 925 (1967).
59. Musgrave, Growth with Equity, 53 Am. ECON. REV. (PAPERS &
PROC.) 323, 329-30 (1963).
60. 113 CONG. REC. H9190 (daily ed. July 24, 1967).
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ment generally by rendering it more profitable.
Boulding asserts: "Economists tend to assume ... that the
'success' of government is measured by the rate of increase of the
gross national product." 61 Fiscal incentives have been widely con-
sidered important tools for encouraging economic growth: "The
effectiveness of tax policy in altering investment behavior is an
article of faith among both policy makers and economists. What-
ever the grounds for this belief, its influence on postwar tax policy
in the United States has been enormous. '62 Research confirms as-
sumptions of impact: "[T] ax policy is highly effective in changing
the level and timing of investment expenditures .... The effects
of accelerated depreciation are very substantial . . . . The effects
of the investment tax credit of 1962 are quite dramatic and leave
little room for doubt about the efficacy of tax policy in influenc-
ing investment behavior. '6 3 Although the expansionary stimulus
of reduced borrowing costs has not yet been satisfactorily quanti-
fied,6 4 it is obvious that exemption from taxation of income from
industrial development bonds complements more conscious govern-
ment growth measures. Since investment is advantageous if the
marginal efficiency of capital is greater than its cost, a firm able
to obtain funds at an artificially low rate of interest can profitably
undertake a wider range of projects."
61. Boulding, The Legitimacy of Economics, 5 W. ECON. J. 299, 307
(1967). Prediction may be substituted for performance:
Sheik Abeid Karume, the first Vice-President of the Republic of
Tanganyika and Zanzibar, on June 6, 1964, promised the 320,000
people of Zanzibar that they "would all be earning £450 by 1966,"
an income £25 greater than the 1962 U.K. average. This re-
markable objective is to be achieved by a three-year Zanzibar de-
velopment plan prepared by the revolutionary government of
Zanzibar. When I questioned an important figure in the revolu-
tionary government about the feasibility of this promise, he re-
plied, "If the Government says it will happen, it will," and eagerly
dropped the subject. The Chinese People's Republic has already
promised Zanzibar an interest-free loan of £5 million, but this is,
unfortunately, only about 1 per cent of the investment required
to reach the promised per capita level.
Keegan, Tanganyika's Five-Year (1964-1969) Development Plan: Sober
Realism or Buoyant Optimism?, in FINANCING AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT 11,
12 n.3 (T. Farer ed. 1965).
62. Hall & Jorgenson, Tax Policy and Investment Behavior, 57 AM.
ECON. REV. 391 (1967). "Tax devices to stimulate investment have certainly
been the greatest fad in economic policy in the past ten years." Eckstein,
Discussion, 52 AM. EcoN. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 351 (1962). See INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §§ 38, 46, 47, 48.
63. Hall & Jorgenson, supra note 62, at 392, 413.
64. See, e.g., Tarshis, The Elasticity of the Marginal Efficiency Func-
tion, 51 AM. EcoN. REV. 958 (1961).
65. Gentry, The Economic Impact and Accounting Treatment of In-
vestment Incentives 47 (unpublished dissertation in University of North
Carolina Library 1966).
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Government intervention appears necessary to achieve ideal
intertemporal allocation of resources: "General equilibrium the-
ory, being static, is inapplicable to the theory of investment."6
We should reject "the twin notions (1) that the rate of interest
determined in an atomistic competitive market need have any
normative significance in the planning of collective investment, and
(2) that the market-determined rate of investment, and hence the
market-determined rate of economic growth, need be optimal in
any welfare sense."67
The cost of borrowing is a rate of discount allocating consump-
tion among time periods. Illogical personal preference for immedi-
ate enjoyment allegedly raises this cost above the most advanta-
geous level:
Generally speaking, everybody prefers present pleasures or
satisfactions of given magnitude to future pleasures or
satisfactions of equal magnitude, even when the latter are
perfectly certain to occur .... Our telescopic faculty is
defective, and ... we, therefore see future pleasures, as it
were, on a diminished scale. That this is the right ex-
planation is proved by the fact that exactly the same
diminution is experienced when ... we contemplate the
past. Hence the existence of preference for present over
equally certain future pleasures does not imply that any
economic dissatisfaction would be suffered if future pleas-
ures were substituted at full value for present ones. The
non-satisfaction this year of a man's preference to con-
sume this year rather than next year is balanced by the
satisfaction of his preference next year to consume next
year rather than to have consumed this year. . . . People
distribute their resources between the present, the near
future and the remote future on the basis of a wholly
irrational preference.68
It has been argued that "the market rate of interest has nothing
to do with the social time preference discount rate."69 Principles
of intertemporal equality should motivate government divergence
from personal weightings: "Society should not discriminate among
generations; hence, it should not have a discount factor. 70
66. MISHAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS-FIVE INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS 98, 116
(1964).
67. Marglin, The Social Rate of Discount and the Optimal Rate of In-
vestment, 77 Q.J. EcON. 95, 111 (1963).
68. PIGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 24-25 (4th ed. 1932).
69. Horvat, The Optimum Rate of Investment Reconsidered, 75 EcoN.
J. 572 (1965).
70. Kurz, Optimal Paths of Capital Accumulation Under the Minimum
Time Objective, 33 ECONOMETRICA 42 (1965). "A time discount should not
govern a nation's decisions-in contrast with an individual's decisions,
where it should." Tinbergen, Optimum Savings and Utility Maximization
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Adjustment of interest rates to reflect more accurately social
time preference would nevertheless leave investment below ideal
levels because of excessive divergence between returns satisfactory
to the saver and those required by the businessman. Although
externalities and market imperfections contribute to this differ-
ential, it is due in large measure to distaste for risk and uncertainty
on the part of the entrepreneur.7 While avoidance of uncompen-
sated earnings variability may prove advantageous to the individual,
such personal gain is usually irrelevant to planners seeking max-
imization of community income. Solow states: "Single productive
investments are far from riskless .... But a large number of in-
vestments taken together carry a greatly reduced risk per dollar,
if only they have some statistical independence. '72  Tobin asserts:
It is not clear that society should take a risk-averse posi-
tion ... and charge a risk premium against those projects
entailing more uncertainties than others. Presumably so-
ciety can pool such risks and realize with a very small
margin of uncertainty the actuarial return on investments.
Moreover, some private risks are not social risks at all. 78
Phelps advocates "subsidies to investment, particularly invest-
ments with demonstrably high variations in rates of return."7 4
Exemption from taxation of income from industrial revenue
bonds appears to encourage capital formation by reducing the cost
to the firm of financing expansion. Since investment is probably
currently below the socially optimum level, this stimulus would
seem beneficial.
over Time, 28 ECONOMETRICA 481 (1960). "Es scheint wie ein Naturgesetz,
dass Wirtschaftsplaner eine niedrigere Diskontrate als die Konsumenten
haben." Gehrels, Wachstum durch Investition in Wissenschaft und Bildung,
94 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLmcHES ARCHlv 215, 225 (1965).
71. Risk occurs when the probability distribution over the set of
possible outcomes is known. That the individual will normally prefer an
unambiguous solution has been frequently demonstrated. Raiffa reports,
for example, that a group of Harvard Business School students, including
some experienced executives, were willing to pay an average of only $30
for an even chance to win $100. The highest price offered for the oppor-
tunity was $45; the lowest only $10. A situation is labeled uncertain when
the probability distribution of possible outcomes is unknown. Here an even
greater monetary discount is normally demanded. Most of Raiffa's students,
when offered reward for selection of a ball of a designated color, either
red or black, preferred to choose from an urn containing an equal number of
balls of each color rather than from an urn containing red and black balls
in unknown proportions. Typically they would pay $35 for an opportunity
to draw for $100 from the first, but only $5 to choose from the second.
Raiffa, Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms: Comment, 75 Q.J. ECON.
690, 693 (1961).
72. SOLOW, CAPITAL THEORY AND THE RATE OF RETURN 46 (1963).
73. Tobin, Economic Growth as an Objective of Government Policy,
54 AM. EcoN. REV. 1, 14 (1964).
74. PHELPS, FIscAL NxuTALr " TowARD ECONoMic GRowTH 85 (1965).
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V. LOCATIONAL CONSEQUENCES
A. IMBALANCE
Only a small fraction of expenditures for new manufacturing
and distribution facilities, now totaling about 60 billion dollars an-
nually in the United States, can be financed by current industrial
development bond issues of 1 billion dollars per year.75 In 1965
between three and four per cent of investment in manufacturing
plant and equipment was supported by issue of such securities or
by tax concessions on the state or local level. 70 The small proportion
of expansion recently receiving aid obviously refutes the assertion
that firms generally assume its availability. There is nevertheless
no consensus concerning the extent to which fiscal inducements
either lead to capital expenditures which would not have occurred
in their absence or attract investment which otherwise would have
been made in areas offering no or less enticing concessions. Claims
that issue of tax-exempt bonds is "the most effective technique
yet devised for rebuilding local economy"7 7 are countered by studies
concluding that "tax cost competition for new industry can have
little effect on industrial location decision making."' 8
Advocates of reform assert: "The programs artificially stimu-
late development in areas which are not otherwise the most effi-
cient location for the industry in terms of markets, material and
productivity."79 Therefore "it is taken for granted that when com-
munities compete with each other for industry, this must neces-
sarily lead to either a cancellation of benefits when all engage in
this game equally vigorously ... or else will lead to a distortion of
resource allocation."80 This position has been attacked as neglect-
ing wage rigidities allegedly precluding optimal response to market
forces.8' A less obvious but. more convincing argument for reten-
tion of at least some of the characteristics of the present tax ex-
emption rests on evidence that unconstrained competitive forces
induce a nonoptimal geographical distribution of economic ac-
tivity.
Economists have observed: "A free market system of organi-
zation, by nature, causes advanced regions . . . to grow, at least in
75. Metcalf, supra note 22, at 26.
76. Bridges, supra note 24, at 6.
77. Note, Industrial Development Bonds: Judicial Construction vs.
Plant Construction, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 262, 297 (1962).
78. Morgan, supra note 46, at 149.
79. 7.B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 696, 701 (1966).
80. MOES, supra note 15, at 221.
81. See MOES, LOCAL SUBSIDIES FOR INDUSTRY (1962). For a review of
the dispute concerning this thesis see Morgan, supra note 46, at 110-13.
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part, at the expense of other regions. '8 2 Consider a uniformly un-
developed plain. By hypothesis, a pioneering industrial enterprise
may locate at any point with equal advantage. Its establishment,
however, differentiates its site from the remaining territory: erec-
tion of other manufacturing facilities requires choice by the decision
maker between contiguous and relatively distant plots. Such pos-
sible benefits as "the availability of economic overhead facilities
(transportation, gas, electricity, water supply, waste disposal, etc.),
the availability of a skilled labor force, ease of exchange of tech-
nical information, and the existence of linked processes (vertical
and horizontal specialization, auxiliary services, etc.)" '8 3 weight
selection probabilities heavily in favor of the agglomerative alter-
native. In addition, payments to workers by previously established
enterprises may provide a spatial demand differential allowing
freight expense minimization through juxtaposition: "The very
market-oriented nature of much modern production tends to lead
to large industrial centres becoming even larger as market expan-
sion feeds on itself to create more market expansion. '8 4 Ullman
summarizes:
The concentration becomes the important geographical
fact. A host of complementary activities and services is
established, each helping the other in pyramiding the pro-
ductive process; the largest market in the country is cre-
ated, in which transport costs dictate location of much
industry if national distribution is desired to take advan-
tage of scale economies. For the fringe areas to develop in
the face of this formidable competition poses an almost
insuperable obstacle.8 5
Effects of such forces are evident in United States growth pat-
terns. Grunwald asserts: "Some States probably experienced a
loss in their economic welfare by joining the U.S. customs union."86
82. Hughes, Interregional Income Differences-Self-Perpetuation, 28 S.
ECON. J. 41 (1961).
83. BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 195 (1961). "The
advantages of concentrating production at one location for many in-
dustries include the scale factor and the possible pecuniary gains from the
localisation of similar industries, as well as economies from the spatial
juxtaposition of unlike industries. For example, the cost of production in
industry X may fall as industry Y expands, owing to the development of
specialised auxiliary services such as machinery repair." Bird, The Need
for Regional Policy in a Common Market, 12 SCOT. J. POL. EcoN. 225, 232
(1965).
84. Bird, supra note 83, at 232.
85. Ullman, Regional Development and the Geography of Concentra-
tion, 4 PAPERS & PROC. REGIONAL Sci. Ass'N 179, 180 (1958).
86. Statement by Joseph Grunwald, Hearings on Latin American
Development and Western Hemisphere Trade Before the Subcommittee on
Inter-American Economic Relationships of the Joint Economic Committee,
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Manufacturing activity is highly concentrated: "In the northeast
... about 7% of the U.S. area has about 70% of the nation's
industrial employment; the rest of the country fights for the re-
mainder not unlike a pack of hungry dogs fighting over a dry
bone., 87
B. ADJUSTMENT
The need for intervention is apparent: "The State . . . cannot
stand still and allow economic forces free play, because this can
only mean an aggravation of the problem and the most unfavored
regions tend to be pushed further into the background in this
way."88 Planners frequently concede that balance can be achieved
only through sacrifice of efficiency:
There exist two equally valid criteria, each of which, how-
ever, leads to diverging and even opposite results. The first
is related to the needs for accelerated development be-
lieved to exist in certain regions due to the present de-
pressed state of their economies. This criterion asserts that
the task of the central government is, in the first instance,
to use its resources to stimulate development in the more
backward areas of the country, so that these areas might,
within a reasonable period, attain to levels of living that
are more compatible with those in the rest of the nation.
The other criterion is oriented towards a better utilization
of resources. Accordingly, resources should be invested
wherever the rates of return to the national product and
to foreign exchange are highest. The application of this
criterion is defended on the grounds that thus the maxi-
mum benefits will accrue to the nation as a whole and that
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1965). The alternative to amalgamation is demon-
strated by local protective efforts prior to 1789: "New York attempted to
keep out firewood from Connecticut and produce from New Jersey by im-
posing heavy duties on those goods; . . . New Jersey replied by placing a
prohibitive tax on the Sandy Hook lighthouse, which happened to be on
New Jersey soil, and the town of New London in Connecticut suspended
all trade with New Yorkers." Freund, Foundations and Development of
American Federalism, in FEDERALISM AND THE NEW NATIONS OF AFRICA 153,
155 (D. Currie ed. 1964). For a modern example of similar practices see
Garden State Dairies, Inc. v. Sills, 46 N.J. 349, 217 A.2d 126 (1966); 80
HARv. L. REV. 1357 (1967).
87. Ullman, supra note 85, at 198.
88. BARZANTI, THE UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS WITHIN THE COMMON MAR-
KET 332 (1965). "If things were left to market forces unhampered by
any policy interferences, industrial production, commerce, banking, insur-
ance, shipping and, indeed, almost all those economic activities which in a
developing economy tend to give a bigger than average return-and, in
addition, science, art, literature, education and higher culture generally-
would cluster in certain localities and regions, leaving the rest of the
country more or less in a backwater." MYRDAL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND
UNDERDEVELOPED REGIONS 26 (1957).
[Vol. 1
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BONDS
backward regions will eventually participate in them.89
Economies and diseconomies of plant location external to the
firm nevertheless cause unconstrained competition to yield concen-
tration beyond the optimal level. Balassa states:
The diseconomies of agglomeration . . . arise as the fur-
ther influx of capital leads to the congestion of urban areas,
overcrowding of transportation facilities, increased cost of
social utilities, and rising factor prices. Such disecono-
mies . . . lead to a divergence between social and private
productivity. Entrepreneurs base their investment and
production decisions on private profitability and take into
account the agglomeration economies appropriated by the
firm, whereas the external economies and diseconomies
created through the activities of the enterprise are not sub-
ject to cost calculation.9
Hirschman asserts: "The external economies due to the poles,
though real, are consistently overestimated by the economic opera-
tors."9' Surveying the American urban experience, Rapkin re-
ports: "There is little doubt that some cities have developed
beyond the optimum point.' ' 92 Therefore "It]he better areas are
crowded beyond reasonable capacity and remoter areas, many
with reasonably good natural endowments, are relatively empty. '93
Potential divergence of social from private advantage may be
simply demonstrated. Assume externalities affect only firm utility
levels. Define:
Ua = utility derived by firm from unit of investment in advanced
region of nation
ub = utility derived by firm from unit of investment in backward
region of nation
qa amount of investment in developed region of nation
qb = amount of investment in underdeveloped region of nation
Ua = total social utility generated by all firms in developed region
of nation
Ub = total social utility generated by all firms in underdeveloped
region of nation
89. OFICINA CENTRAL DE COORDINACI6N Y PLANIFICAcI6N, PLAN DE LA
NAcI6N, 1963-1966, at 414, quoted in FRIEDMANN, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
PoLicy-A CASE STUDY OF VENEZUELA 48 (1966). "Whether industry is forced
to establish at one place rather than another... or whether incentives are
created that tend to favor one point relative to another for certain types of
industries, the net result is certain to be a reduction in the total flow of
industry into the area .... Subsidizing 'lagging sectors' is a luxury .... "
Massell, East African Economic Union-An Evaluation and some Impli-
cations for Policy 58-59 (Rand Corporation Memorandum RM-3880-RC,
Dec. 1963).
90. BALASSA, supra note 83, at 195-96.
91. HIRSCHMANN, THE STRATEGY OF EcoNoMIc DEVELOPMENT 185 (1958).
92. Rapkin, Some Effects of Economic Growth on the Character of
Cities, 46 AM. EcoN. REV. (PAPERS & PRoc.) 293, 297 (1956).
93. Ullman, supra note 85, at 180.
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Write:
(1) Ua = f(qa)
(2) ub = f(qb)
(3) Ua -uaqa
(4) Ub = ubqb.
Differentiate (3) and (4) with respect to q to obtain:
dUa dua(5) = Ua + qa
dqa dqa
dUb dub
(6) = ut, + q .
dqb dqb
Investment by the entrepreneur will be directed toward the
leading sector of the nation as long as Ua > ub. On the other hand,
incremental application of capital to projects in the less developed
area will provide greater gain to the community if:
dub dua
(7) ub + qb- > Ua + qa-.
dqb dqa
Thus, if left uncontrolled, the market mechanism will dictate un-
economic geographical concentration of production facilities when:
dub dua
(8) Ua -Ub < qb-- qa-'
dqb dqa
dub dua
It seems likely that qb - will frequently exceed qa -; asser-
dqb dqa
dua
tions of urban congestion imply that qa - is negative. Since the
dqa
probability of use of industrial development bonds by a given
community would appear positively correlated with the magnitude
of expected local benefit, their availability should alleviate im-
balances caused by competitive forces. Indeed such securities have
thus far been issued primarily by authorities in lagging southern
states.9 4 Unlike alternative means of attracting manufacturing
activity, these bonds may be employed at no cost to the locality.
Without the tax exemption, it may be argued, "an impoverished
community would not have it within its economic power to outbid
other areas in offering ... inducements."' 5
VI. CONCLUSION
The difficulty of evaluating the proposals to remove the tax
exemption presently granted income from industrial development
94. MORGAN, supra note 46, at 155.
95. Walker, The Plant, the Office and the City (pt. 2), TAX PoLicy,
Jan.-Feb. 1956, at 3, 15.
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bonds lies less in identifying their advantages and defects than in
quantifying these characteristics for purposes of comparison. Even
conceding that geographical dispersion of manufacturing activ-
ity resulting from use of such securities is beneficial while the
concomitant decrease in tax progressivity is harmful, for example,
empirical evidence is insufficient to demonstrate conclusively that
gains from the former outweigh losses from the latter. Reduction
of the problem to whether the financing technique in question
should be eliminated is irresponsible oversimplification: reform
should seek to isolate desirable consequences and preserve them
while avoiding other effects through introduction of more sophisti-
cated alternative fiscal instruments. If this is done the present
interdependence among decisions concerning income distribution,
concessions to local government, encouragement of capital ex-
penditure, and subsidization of industry locating in less developed
regions can be substantially lessened. Criticism of use of industrial
development bonds appears well founded only when directed to-
ward their availability as an almost riskless tax shelter to the af-
fluent.
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